Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in committee selection and beyond. Among the various criteria put forth for desirability of a committee, Pareto optimality is a minimal and important requirement. As asking agents to specify their preferences over exponentially many subsets of alternatives is practically infeasible, we assume that each agent specifies a weak order on single alternatives, from which a preference relation over subsets is derived using some preference extension. We consider five prominent extensions (responsive, downward lexicographic, upward lexicographic, best, and worst). For each of them, we consider the corresponding Pareto optimality notion, and we study the complexity of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes. For each of the preference extensions, we give a complete characterization of the complexity of testing Pareto optimality when preferences are dichotomous or linear. We also consider strategic issues: for four of the set extensions, we present a linear-time, Pareto optimal and strategyproof algorithm that even works for weak preferences.
Introduction
Pareto optimality is a central concept in collective decision making and has been termed the "single most important tool of normative economic analysis" [33] . An outcome is Pareto optimal if there does not exist another outcome that all agents like at least as much and at least one agent strictly prefers. Although Pareto optimality has been considered extensively in single-winner voting and other social choice settings such as fair division or hedonic games, it has received only little attention in multiwinner voting, in which the outcomes are sets of alternatives. Multiwinner voting applies to selecting a set of plans or a committee, hiring team members, movie recommendations, and more. It constitutes a general model of collective decision making that captures several decision making scenarios in artificial intelligence. For convenience, we use the terminology "committee" even if our results have an impact far beyond committee elections [7, 27] .
In single-winner voting setting, agents express preferences over alternatives and a single alternative is selected. Pareto optimality in this context is straightforward to define, achieve, and verify. In multiwinner voting, a well-known difficulty is that it is unrealistic to assume that agents will report preferences over all possible committees, since there is an exponential number of them. For this reason, most approaches assume that they only report a small part of their preferences, and that some extension principle is used to induce a preference over all possible subsets from this 'small input' over single alternatives [9] . Such preference extensions are also widely used in other social choice settings such as fair division or matching. The two most widely used choices of 'small inputs' in multiwinner voting are rankings (linear orders) over alternatives and sets of approved alternatives. In this paper we make a choice that generalizes both of them: agents report weak orders over single alternatives. Then we consider five prominent preference extension principles: the responsive (RS) extension, where a set of alternatives S is at least as preferred as a set of alternatives T if S is obtained from T by repeated replacements of an alternative by another alternative which is at least as preferred; the optimistic, or 'best' (respectively pessimistic, or 'worst') extension, which orders subsets of alternatives according to their most (respectively, least) preferred element; the downward lexicographic (DL) extension, a lexicographic refinement of the optimistic extension, and the upward lexicographic (UL) extension, a lexicographic refinement of the pessimistic (worst) extension.
The responsive set extension [9, 37] can be seen as the ordinal counterpart of additivity. The downward lexicographic extension has been considered in various papers [12, 29, 30] . The 'best' set extension has been considered in a number of approaches such as full proportional representation [18, 32] and other committee voting settings [25] . The 'worst' set extension, also used by Klamler et al. [29] and Skowron et al. [39] , captures settings where the impact of a bad alternative in the selection overwhelms the benefits of good alternatives: for instance, when the decision about a crucial issue will be made by one of the members of the committee but the agent ignores which one and is risk-averse; or the case of a parent's preferences over a set of movies to be watched by a child. The 'best' and 'worst' set extensions have also been used in coalition formation [2, 17] .
Although set extensions have been implicitly or explicitly considered in multiwinner voting, most of the computational work has dealt with specific voting rules (see Sect. 2). Instead, we concentrate on Pareto optimality, consider the computation and verification of Pareto optimal committees, as well as the existence of a polynomial-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns Pareto optimal outcomes.
Contributions
We consider Pareto optimality with respect to the five aforementioned preference set extensions. We present various connections between the Pareto optimality notions. For each of the notions, we undertake a detailed study of complexity of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the complexity results for partial  ordering and Table 2 proposes dichotomy complexity results, that is coNP-complete (coNP-C in short) versus polynomial-time (P in short) for dichotomous preferences depending on the size of top equivalence class or for linear preferences.
We show that there exist linear-time Pareto optimal and strategyproof algorithms for committee voting even for weak preferences for four of the five set extensions. The algorithms can be considered as careful adaptations of serial dictatorship for committee voting.
For responsive, downward lexicographic, upward lexicographic, best and worst extensions, we give a complete characterization of the complexity of testing Pareto optimality when preferences are dichotomous or linear. More precisely, we prove that for the first three extensions (i.e., RS, DL and UL) that under the assumption that P ≠ NP, Pareto optimality can be tested in polynomial time if and only if the size of the first equivalence classes is at most two. We refer to the the maximum size of top equivalence class as topwidth (tw in short). For the 'best' extension, unless P = NP, Pareto optimality can be tested in polynomial time if and only if the size of the first equivalence classes is at most one. In contrast to the other extensions, for the 'worst' extension, both problems of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes admit polynomial-time algorithms for every partial ordering. These results are summarized in Table 2 .
Note for the 'best' extension, we also show that even computing a Pareto optimal outcome is NP-hard. An important take-home message of the results is that testing Pareto optimality or obtaining Pareto improvements over status-quo committees can be computationally hard even when computing some Pareto optimal committee is easy. These results are similar in spirit to results concerning computing or testing Pareto optimal resource allocations [8, 22] . 
Related work
A first related stream of work involves studying specific committee election rules from a computational point of view (generally with little or no focus on Pareto optimality). Our focus on determining whether a committee is Pareto optimal or on finding a Pareto optimal committee, is in some sense orthogonal to the study of committee election rules. The simplest (and most widely used) rules for electing a committee, called best-k rules, compute a score for each alternative based on the ranks, and the alternatives with the best k scores are elected [24, 26] . Scoring-based extension principles have also been used by Darmann [21] . Note that the output of a best-k rule is obviously Pareto-optimal for the preferences induced by this scoring function, but not necessarily with respect to other set extensions.
Klamler et al. [29] compute optimal committees under a weight constraint for a single agent (therefore optimality is equivalent to Pareto optimality), using several preference extensions including 'worst', 'best', and downward lexicographic.
The 'best' ( B ) extension principle has been used in a number of papers on committee elections by full proportional representation, starting with [18] and studied from a computational point of view in a long series of papers (e.g., [11, 23, 31, 36, 38] . These rules obviously output Pareto optimal committees for B , but not necessarily for other extensions.
Some of the set extensions considered in this paper have corresponding analogues when extending preferences over alternatives to preferences over 'lotteries over alternatives.' In particular, the RS set extension corresponds to SD (stochastic dominance) lottery extension. Also the DL and UL set extensions considered in this paper correspond to DL and UL lottery extensions considered in works in probabilistic social choice [4, 14, 19] .
Some works are based on the Hamming extension. Each agent specifies his ideal committee and she prefers committees with lower Hamming distance from the ideal committee. The Hamming distance notion can be used to define specific rules such as minimax approval voting [13] , which selects the committee minimizing the maximum Hamming distance for the agents. Although the output of minimax approval voting is not always Pareto-optimal for the Hamming extension, there are good Pareto-optimal approximations of it [16] . Note that for dichotomous preferences, the Hamming extension coincides with the responsive and the downward lexicographic extensions, therefore our computational results for responsive set extension for dichotomous preferences also hold for the Hamming and downward lexicographic extensions.
A second line of work concerns understanding the classes of rules that result in Pareto optimal outcomes. Most papers along this line focus on a different type of committee elections, called designated-seat voting, where candidates must declare the seat they contest [10] . 1 Results about the existence or non-existence of Pareto optimal rules have been presented [10, 20, 34] .
The complexity of testing Pareto optimality has been examined in other social choice settings including resource allocation (see e.g. [8, 22] ).
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Setup
We consider a set of agents N = {1, … , n} , a set of alternatives A = {a 1 , … , a m } and a preference profile ≿= (≿ 1 , … , ≿ n ) such that each ≿ i is a complete and transitive relation over A. We write a ≿ i b to denote that agent i values a at least as much as b and use ≻ i for the strict part of
We will use these equivalence classes to represent the preference relation of an agent as a preference list
For example, we will denote the preferences a ∼ i b ≻ i c by the list i ∶ {a, b}, {c} . An agent i's preferences are strict if the size of each equivalence class is 1. When all agent preferences are strict we also refer to them as linear preferences. An agent i's preferences are dichotomous if she partitions the alternatives into just two equivalence classes, i.e., k i = 2 . Let tw(≿) be the maximum size of the most preferred equivalence class, i.e., tw(≿) = max i≤n |E 1 i | . For any S ⊆ A , we will denote by max ≿ i (S) and min ≿ i (S) the alternatives in S that are maximally and minimally preferred by i respectively. Thus, if q and r are respectively the smallest and the largest indices such that
Set extensions and Pareto optimality
Set extensions are used for reasoning about the preferences of an agent over sets of alternatives given their preferences over single alternatives. For fixed-size committee voting, the responsive set extension (RS) is very natural and has been applied in various matching settings as well [9, 37] . For all V, W ∈ S k (A) , we say that W ≿ RS i V if and only if there is an injection f from V to W such that for each a ∈ V , agent i weakly prefers f(a) to a, i.e. f (a) ≿ i a.
We define the best set extension and the worst set extension which are denoted B and W respectively.
In the downward lexicographic (DL) extension, an agent prefers a committee that selects more alternatives from his most preferred equivalence class, in case of equality, the one with more alternatives for the second most preferred equivalence class, and so on.
In the upward lexicographic (UL) extension, an agent prefers a committee that selects less alternatives from his least preferred equivalence class, in case of equality, the one with less alternatives for the second least preferred equivalence class, and so on. Formally,
Remark 1 Consider an agent i with preferences
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The relations follow from the definitions.
Efficiency based on set extensions. With each set extension E , we can define Pareto optimality with respect to E . For two committees W,
Note that for each of our set extensions, E-efficiency coincides with standard Pareto optimality when k = 1 . An outcome is a Pareto improvement over another if each agent weakly improves and at least one agent strictly improves. 
Example 1 Consider the preference profile:
The argument is as follows. By contraposition, suppose S is not RS-efficient, then there exists some other outcome T such that
Remark 3
There always exists a B-efficient committee that is also DL-efficient: DL Pareto improvements over a B-efficient does not harm any agent with respect to the B relation.
Remark 4
There always exists a W-efficient committee that is also UL-efficient: UL Pareto improvements over a W-efficient does not harm any agent with respect to the W relation.
In Fig. 1 , we illustrate the relations between the different efficiency notions. Later on in the paper we will present an algorithm that returns a committee that is UL-efficient and DL-efficient, and hence RS-efficient.
We also make the following general observation. Proof Suppose there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a Pareto improvement over a committee for each of the specified set extensions. We will show that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an E-efficient committee under set extensions E ∈ {RS, DL, UL, W, B} . We start with any given committee and we recursively apply Pareto improvements until we reach a Pareto optimal committee. For the 'best' and 'worst' extensions, there can be at most mn Pareto improvements because for one agent there can be at most m improvements. Since an RS-improvement implies a DL-improvement, let us bound the number of Pareto-improvements with respect to DL. In each Pareto-improvement, for the agent who strictly improves, the most preferred equivalence class that has different number of alternative in the outcome increases by at least one. Therefore the most preferred equivalence class can be the improving class in at most m of the Pareto improvements. Similarly, the number of Pareto improvements in the subsequent less preferred equivalence class improves in a Pareto improvement can be at most m of the Pareto improvements. Therefore the total number of DL Pareto-improvements is bounded by m 2 n . A similar argument holds for UL as well. ◻
We end this section by observing that, under any of the set extensions we consider, a set of Pareto optimal alternatives may be Pareto dominated. Consider the following example. The set {c, d} consists of Pareto optimal alternatives but is Pareto dominated by {a, b} under any of our set extensions. Therefore, adding a Pareto optimal alternative one by one is not sufficient to obtain a Pareto optimal committee.
A general algorithm to compute a DL/UL/RS-efficient committee
For any preference of an agent i, one can consider a scoring vector which gives points to the alternatives. We say that a scoring vector is consistent if for any two alternatives a and b in A such that a ≻ i b , the scoring vector gives less points to b than a and for a ∼ i b , the scoring vector gives both a and b the same number of points. We note that there is a trivial way to achieve Pareto optimality under the responsive set extension by taking any scoring vector consistent with the ordinal preferences, finding the total score of each alternative contributed all the agents, and returning the set of k alternatives with the maximum scores. For instance, in Example 2, the outcome of the rule that outputs the alternatives with the best k Borda scores is {a, b} . We first note that an RS-efficient (Pareto optimal committee under the responsive set extension) committee can be computed in linear time.
Next, we present a general polynomial-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns a DL-efficient and UL-efficient and hence RS-efficient committee. For a given preference profile ≿ we will denote by (≿ � i , ≿ −i ) the preference profile in which the preference of agents in N⧵{i} are unchanged from ≿ but agent i's preference changes from ≿ i to ≿ ′ i . An algorithm ALG is strategyproof if reporting truthful preferences is a dominant strategy with respect to the responsive set extension:
. Note that defining strategyproofness in this way with respect to the RS extension is stronger than defining it for any of the other four extensions considered in this paper. Nonetheless, we will present some positive results with respect to strategyproofness.
A naive way of achieving RS-efficiency and Pareto optimality is to enumerate the list of possible winning sets and implement serial dictatorship over the possible outcomes as is done in voting [4] . In such an approach, agents come in a serial order and refine the set of outcomes to their most preferred ones. However, the number of possible outcomes is exponential and responsive preferences result in a partial order over the possible winning sets and not a complete and transitive order. This problem is solved by Algorithm 1 which can be viewed as a computationally efficient serial dictatorship. In the algorithm, for a given permutation on N, the first agent in the order chooses the best committee and imposes her choice to the rest of agents. In the case where the agent is indifferent between several committees, she leaves the choice of the committee chosen to the subsequent agents. The process is repeated until all agents have made their refinements.
Theorem 1 There exists a linear-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns a committee that is Pareto optimal under RS, DL, and UL set extensions.
Proof Consider Algorithm 1. We show that at each stage i ′ , agent (i � ) , implicitly refines the set of feasible committees to the maximal set of most preferred outcomes from the set by providing additional constraints. This is true for the base case i � = 1 . Now assume it holds from 1 to i ′ . Note that L contains all those alternatives that are strictly less preferred by agents in { (1), … , (i � )} than the ones they respectively fixed. Moreover, each agent in { (1), … , (i � )} is indifferent between the alternatives in L. As for (i � + 1) , she fixes the best
) ∩ L� alternatives are selected from his equivalence class E t (i � +1) which is ensured by the definition of the algorithm. Thus, each agent in her turn refines the set of possible outcomes to her most preferred subset of outcomes. Each committee in the refined set is at least as preferred with respect to RS (and hence with respect to DL and UL) to all committees in the set of possible outcomes. Thus the outcome is DL-efficient and UL-efficient and hence RS-efficient.
For strategyproofness, we observe that the set of feasible committees is a k-set of the dynamically changing set of alternatives. Each such k-set contains all the alternatives from W and the remaining k − |W| alternatives from L. At any point, the size of L is at least k − |W| . Observe that before a given agent (i � ) 's turn comes, she has no control over what W and L are and therefore she cannot control the set of feasible committees. When agent (i � ) turn comes, she cannot change W. She only has a choice over fixing certain alternatives in L and requiring certain number of alternatives to be chosen from L. In this case, the algorithm chooses for agent (i � ) , his most preferred alternatives from L by further fixing all the alternatives in ( ⋃ t−1 j=1 E j i ∩ L) and adding them to W. Furthermore, since enough alternatives need to be kept from L to ensure that committees of size k are feasible, the algorithm shortlists alternatives from his equivalence class E t (i � ) . Note that (i � ) does not care which alternatives from E t (i � ) are selected because she is indifferent between them. Therefore each possible k-set committee as a result of agent (i � ) 's truthful preference is Page 10 of 20 one of the best possible committee that she can enforce among the set of feasible committees. After agent (i � ) 's turn, she is completely indifferent among all possible committees that can form because she is indifferent between all the alternatives in L ⊂ E t (i � ) . Hence the algorithm is strategyproof. ◻
The result above contrasts with the fact that strategyproofness is incompatible with very weak notions of proportional representation [35] . Note that for k = 1 , the algorithm is equivalent to serial dictatorship as formalized by Aziz et al. [3] . Note that a committee that is Pareto optimal under the responsive set extension may not be a result of serial dictatorship. This holds even for k = 1 and the basic voting setting.
The problem with the serial dictatorship algorithm formalized is that it overly favours the agent that is the first in the permutation. One way to limit his power is to let her choose only ⌈k∕n⌉ alternatives. We note that this attempt at having a fairer extension of serial dictatorship comes at an expense because strategyproofness is compromised. Consider the profile in which 1 has preferences a, b, c and 2 has preferences a, c, b. For k = 2 , and permutation 12, the outcome is {a, c} . But if agent 1 reports b, a, c, then the outcome is {a, b}.
Testing Pareto optimality under RS/UL/DL extension
In many situations, one may already have a status-quo committee and one may want to find a Pareto improvement over it. This problem of testing Pareto optimality and finding a Pareto improvement under the responsive set extension turns out to be a much harder task. Note that if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a Pareto improvement, then it means that testing Pareto optimality is also polynomial-time solvable.
Dichotomous preferences
First, we consider the case of dichotomous preferences. The nice aspect of dichotomous preferences is that RS-efficiency, DL-efficiency, and UL-efficiency coincide under them. Hence, our results in this section apply to all the three concepts. Our central result in the section is a characterization of the conditions under which testing Pareto optimality in coNP-complete. The condition identified is based on the size of the tw.
Theorem 2 Checking whether a committee is RS-efficient (Pareto optimal under
the responsive set extension) is coNP-complete even for dichotomous preferences and tw(≿) ≥ 3.
Proof
We only present the case where tw(≿) = 3 . The reduction is from the NP-complete problem vertex cover [28] . Given a simple graph G = (V, E) , the minimum vertex cover problem consists in finding a subset C ⊆ V of minimum size such that every edge e ∈ E is incident to some node of C. Its decision version vertex cover takes as input a simple graph G = (V, E) and an integer k and problem is deciding if there exists a vertex cover C ⊆ V of G with |C| ≤ k.
Let ⟨(V, E), k⟩ be an instance of vertex cover, with [x, y] being one arbitrary edge in E. We build the following instance of Pareto optimality under RS:
• N = ∪ e∈E N e ∪ {a} , where for each edge e ∈ E , N e = {e 1 , … , e k } is a set of k agents, and a is a special agent.
• For each e = [u, v] ∈ E , the preferences of agent e i , for i = 1, … , k , and of agent a, are
The reduction is clearly done within polynomial time and preferences are dichotomous. We claim that the committee D (of size k) is not Pareto optimal under RS if and only if there exists a vertex cover of G of size at most k.
The condition is sufficient. Let C ⊆ V be a vertex cover of G with a size exactly k (if it is strictly less, then we add arbitrarily vertices). Then set C Pareto dominates D because there is an improvement for agent a because edge [x, y] is covered by C and indifference for the others agents.
Conversely, let S be a Pareto improvement of D. Because, S ≠ D , then, agent a strictly prefers S to D. Then, S = C ∪ D � where on the one hand D ′ ⊆ D , |D � | = |D| − |C| and on the other hand C ⊆ V , C ≠ ∅ and |C| ≤ k . Let N i E be the agents defined by:
she is indifferent between alternative d i and one vertex u, v of C if |C ∩ {u, v}| = 1 and is strictly better off if {u, v} ⊆ C . This means that C is a vertex cover of G with a size at most k. ◻
We point out that for dichotomous preferences, the responsive set extension coincides with the downward lexicographic set extension and the upward lexicographic set extension. Hence we get a corollaries of our results for responsive preferences.
Corollary 1
Checking whether a committee is DL-efficient is coNP-complete, even for dichotomous preferences and tw(≿) ≥ 3.
Corollary 2
Checking whether a committee is UL-efficient is coNP-complete, even for dichotomous preferences and tw(≿) ≥ 3.
Using a similar reduction from the Hitting Set problem, we can also prove that checking whether a committee is Pareto optimal under the responsive set extension is W[2]-complete under parameter k, even for dichotomous preferences. Hitting Set is defined as follows: given a ground set X of elements, and a collection C = {C 1 , … , C } of subsets of X, does there exist a H ⊂ X such that |H| ≤ k and H ∩ C ≠ � for all C ∈ C?
For dichotomous preferences we present a complete characterization of the complexity according to the tw(≿) parameter. If tw(≿) = 1 , then in any Pareto improvement over committee D, any alternative in D that is most preferred by some agent needs to be kept selected, and therefore the problem of checking RS-efficiency is easy. If tw(≿) ≥ 3 , from Theorem 2, the problem is hard. The only case remaining is tw(≿) = 2.
Theorem 3 For dichotomous preferences, a Pareto improvement over a committee with respect to the responsive set extension (or DL or UL set extension) can be computed in polynomial time when tw(≿) ≤ 2.
Proof Consider a preference profile ≿= (≿ 1 , … , ≿ n ) where each ≿ i is dichotomous and First, if for all i ∈ N , E 1 i ⊆ D , then D is obviously RS-efficient. Assume it is not the case, that is, for some i ∈ N , E 1 i ⧵D ≠ ∅ . We refer to the case as (1) . Let
N ′ corresponds to the set of agents that have all their top alternatives selected in D N ′′ corresponds to the set of agents that have one out of two alternatives selected in D ⧵ W ′ (the other alternatives are in E 2 i ) The set N ⧵ (N � ∪ N �� ) corresponds to the set of agents who have no top alternative selected in D.
a q } for some i ∈ N �� : each edge of G corresponds to the top two alternatives of some agent, provided one of them is in D ⧵ W ′ . Let (G) be the size of an optimal vertex cover of G.
We first claim that there is a Pareto improvement over D if and only if one of following two conditions is satisfied:
, and there is an optimal vertex cover of G containing either at least an element of E 1 i for some i ∉ N � ∪ N �� , or two elements of E 1 i for some i ∈ N �� .
We first show that (i) and (ii) are sufficient. If (i) holds then take a committee corresponding to a minimum vertex cover of G, add to it the k ′ alternatives of W ′ , and add (k − k � ) − (G) alternatives, with at least one in ∪ i∈N (E 1 i ⧵ D) ; this is possible because of (1). If (ii) holds, then take a committee corresponding to a minimum vertex cover of G, and add to it the k ′ alternatives of W ′ . In both cases, the obtained committee contains E 1 i for all i ∈ N � , contains at least one element of E 1 i for all i ∈ N � , and contains either two elements of E 1 i for some i ∈ N �� , or an element of E 1 i for some i ∉ N ∪ N �� . Therefore it is a Paretoimprovement over D.
Now, we show that (i) and (ii) are necessary. Suppose there exists a Pareto improvement over D. Among all such Pareto improvements, consider W ∈ S k (A) to be a Pareto improvement of D containing a maximum number of alternatives from D. We have the following two properties: W ′ ⊆ W and W ⧵ W ′ is a vertex cover of G. W ′ ⊆ W holds, since otherwise there would be an i ∈ N � such that W ′ ≿ RS i D does not hold. For similar reasons,
, then by adding to it any set of D ⧵ C ′ of size k − k � − (G) we obtain a set of size k which constitutes a Pareto improvement of D because now,
It remains to be shown that (i) and (ii) can be checked in polynomial time. (i) can be done in polynomial-time because G is bipartite: indeed, by construction, G is two-colorable with color sets A �� ∩ D and A ′′ ⧵ D , and by König's theorem, for bipartite graphs, the problem of finding the minimum vertex cover is equivalent to computing a maximum matching, hence solvable in polynomial time. As for (ii), if (G) = k − k � , we have to check whether for some optimal vertex cover C of G, either (ii.1) E 1 i ∩ C ≠ � holds for some i ∉ (N � ∪ N �� ) , or (ii.2) E 1 i ⊆ C for some i ∈ N �� . In order to check (ii.1), for each i ∉ (N � ∪ N �� ) such that there exists 
Example 3
We illustrate the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 3. Let k = 2 and consider the dichotomous profile, where we specify only the top equivalence class of each agent: Figure 2 illustrates the main graphs in Example 3.
Note that finding an algorithm that computes a Pareto improvement over a committee can be used to decide whether a given a committee D of size k, is Pareto optimal under the responsive set extension.
Linear preferences
Now, we deal with the case of linear preferences.
Theorem 4 Checking whether a committee is RS-efficient is coNP-complete for linear preferences.
Proof The proof is an adaptation of Theorem 2. The reduction from vertex cover is almost the same, except we do not consider agent a. For any edge e = [u, v] ∈ E and for i = 1, … , k , the strict preferences for agent e i are given by: Fig. 2 Graphs encountered while simulating the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 3 on the problem instance in Example 3. In each graph, the circled vertices form an optimal vertex cover where strict preferences over a subset Z are arbitrary given (for instance, {u, v}, d means either u > v > d or v > u > d).
As previously, we claim that committee D (of size k) is not Pareto optimal under RS if and only if there exists a vertex cover of G of size at most k.
Let C ⊆ V be a vertex cover of G with |C| = k , where v e ∈ C is a vertex covering edge e ∈ E . Consider an arbitrary agent e i for some i ∈ {1, … , k} and e = [u, v] ∈ E . By construction, v e ≻ RS e i d i and (C ⧵ {v e }) ≿ RS e i (D ⧵ {d i }) since D ⧵ {d i } are the least preferred candidates for agent e i . Hence, C ≻ RS D . Conversely, the proof is similar to the one given in Theorem 2. Let D ′ be a Pareto improvement of D, that is D ′ ≻ RS D ; then, there is Proof The proof is exactly the same as that of Theorem 4 because in that reduction for any
We end the subsection with the case of upward lexicographic set extension.
Theorem 6
Checking whether a committee is UL-efficient is coNP-complete for linear preferences.
Proof The reduction is given from vertex cover. Let ⟨G = (V, E), k � ⟩ be an instance of vertex cover where |V| = k , |E| = m and k ′ < k . We build the following instance of Pareto optimality under UL where the size of committee is k. There are mk ′ agents e i for e ∈ E and i ∈ {1, … , k � } and a set of k + k � alternatives A = V ∪ D where D = {d 1 , … , d k � } . The strict preferences of agent e i for e = [u, v] ∈ E and i = 1, … , k � are given by:
where strict preferences over a subset Z are arbitrary given as explained in Theorem 4. The reduction is clearly done within polynomial time and the set of preferences are strict. We claim that G has a vertex cover of size k ′ iff committee V of size k is not Pareto optimal under UL.
Actually, it is the case that (V ⧵ C) ∪ D) ≻ UL e i V for every agent e i with e ∈ E since alternative f(e) is missing in the committee. Conversely, let V ′ be a Pareto improvement of V under UL, ie., V ′ ≻ UL V ; then, there is d i ∈ V � for some i ∈ {1, … , k � } . We will prove C = V ⧵ V � is a vertex cover of G. By contradiction, assume C is not a vertex cover of G; then some edge e = [u, v] ∈ E is not covered by C, or equiva-
conclusion, C is a vertex cover of size at most |C| = |V ⧵ V � | ≤ |D| = k � and the proof is complete. ◻
'Best' set extension
Next, we consider Pareto optimality with respect to the best set extension B , which has been used for defining many rules (see Sect. 2).
Theorem 7
Checking whether a committee is B-efficient is coNP-complete, even for dichotomous preferences and tw(≿) ≥ 2.
Proof
We only present the case where tw(≿) = 2 . and as previously the reduction is from vertex cover. Let ⟨G = (V, E), k � ⟩ be an instance of vertex cover where |V| = k , |E| = m and k ′ < k (otherwise the answer of vertex cover is clearly trivial). We build the following instance of Pareto optimality under B where the size of committee is k. We construct the following profile P:
• Let e = [u, v] ∈ E be an edge of G; the preferences of agent e for e ∈ E are:
• The preferences of the k(k − k � ) agents v i are given by:
• The preferences of the last k − k � agents i are given by:
The reduction is clearly done within polynomial time and the set of preferences given by ≿ are dichotomous with tw(≿) = 2 . We claim that G has a vertex cover of size k ′ iff committee V of size k is not Pareto optimal under B.
The problem becomes easy to solve if the topwidth is less than or equal to 1 which is equivalent to topwdith being one. Proof Under the conditions, a given committee W is B-efficient, if either (1) each agent has a most preferred candidate in W or (2) each candidate in W is a most preferred candidate of some agent. We prove the statement as follows. If (1) holds, then W is clearly B-efficient. If (2) holds, then no candidate from W can be replaced without making at least one agent less happy. Hence W is B-efficient. Now suppose that neither (1) nor (2) hold. Then this means that there exists some candidate that is not the most preferred of any agent. Such a candidate can be replaced by the most preferred candidate of that agent who has no top candidate in W. Such a replacement leads to a Pareto improvement with respect to the 'best' set extension. ◻ Theorem 9 Computing a B-efficient committee is NP-hard, even for dichotomous preferences.
Proof We give a reduction from Hitting Set. Recall that Hitting Set is defined as follows:
given a ground set X of elements, and a collection C = {C 1 , … , C } of subsets of X, does there exist a H ⊂ X such that |H| ≤ k and H ∩ C ≠ � for all C ∈ C ? Let N = {1, … , } , A = X and for each i ∈ N , i's dichotomous preferences are i ∶ C i , (X ⧵ C i ). If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a B-efficient committee, it will return a committee in which each agent gets a most preferred alternative if such a committee exists. But such a committee corresponds to a hitting set of size k. ◻
Dealing with linear preferences, in contrast to Theorem 9, a B-efficient committee can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 10 Under linear preferences, there is a linear-time algorithm to compute a B
-efficient committee.
Proof The algorithm works as follows. We go agent by agent and let her pick her most preferred candidate if it has not already been chosen. We stop when k candidates have been selected or all agents have been exhausted. If all the agents have been exhausted but k candidates have not been selected, we can fill the remaining slots by choosing arbitrary candidates. The algorithm chooses a most preferred committee for the agents who have their most preferred candidate in the committee. For other agents, there simply is not enough space to get an improvement for them without affecting the agents who have their most preferred candidate in the committee. Hence the outcome is B-efficient. ◻
The algorithm in the proof of Theorem 10 is also strategyproof under the assumption that agents' preferences over committees are according to the 'best' set extension.
Finally, note the same proof as the one given in Theorem 4 allows to conclude the following.
Theorem 11
Checking whether a committee is B-efficient is coNP-complete for linear preferences.
Proof The proof is identical to Theorem 4 because in that reduction, for any D � ∈ S k (A) ,
'Worst' set extension
In contrast to all the other set extensions considered in the paper, Pareto optimality with respect to the 'worst' set extension can be checked in polynomial time.
Theorem 12 There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that checks whether a committee is W-efficient and computes a Pareto improvement over it if possible.
i be the least preferred equivalence class such that E t i i ∩ W ≠ � . We want to check whether there is a k-set D of alternatives in which at least some agent i ∈ N gets a strictly better outcome and all the other agents get at least as preferred an outcome. We check this as follows. For i ∈ N , let
. Informally, B i is the set of alternatives that do not contain any alternative that is worse for some agent j ≠ i than her least preferred alternative in W and it also does not contain any alternative that is equally preferred or less preferred by agent i than her least preferred alternative in W. We check whether |B i | ≥ k or not. If |B i | ≥ k , we know that there exists a subset of B i , that is strictly more preferred by i ∈ N and at least as preferred by each agent. The reason is that B i contains a more preferred worst alternative for agent i than D and contains at least as preferred worst alternative for other agents j than D. If |B i | < k , then this means that a Pareto improvement with i strictly improving is only possible if the size of the winning set is less than k which is not feasible. ◻
We now consider strategyproofness together with W-efficiency. We first note that Algorithm 1 may not return a W-efficient outcome. However, we construct a suitable strategyproof and W-efficient algorithm by formalising an appropriate serial dictatorship algorithm for the worst set extension.
Theorem 13 There exists a linear-time and strategyproof algorithm that returns a W-efficient committee.
Proof Consider the agents in a permutation . The set of alternatives A ′ is initialized to A.
We reduce the set A ′ while ensuring that it is of size at least k. The next agent i in the permutation comes and deletes the maximum number of least preferred equivalence classes from his preferences and the corresponding alternatives in A ′ while ensuring that |A ′ | ≥ k . The algorithm is formally specified as Algorithm 2. Each successive agent in the permutation gets a most preferred outcome while ensuring that agents before her in the permutation get at least as preferred an outcome as before. Thus the algorithm is strategyproof and Pareto optimal with respect to the 'worst' set extension. ◻
Conclusions
We considered Pareto optimality in multi-winner voting with respect to several prominent set extensions. For the set extensions considered in the paper, we presented a clear picture of the complexity of computing and testing Pareto optimal committees. We presented results on the relations between the notions as well as complexity of computing and verifying Pareto optimal outcomes. Further directions of future work include considering Pareto optimality with respect to other set extensions [15] . Since Pareto optimality is considered a minimal requirement, it will be interesting to consider the compatibility of Pareto optimality concepts with other axioms based on the idea of proportional representation (see e.g. Aziz and Lee [1] ) or Condorcet's principle (see e.g. Aziz et al. [6] ). It will also be interesting to study the computational complexity of computing committees that simultaneously satisfy Pareto optimality as well as other axiomatic properties. Many of our results carry over to combinations of properties. For example, if computing a Pareto optimal committee is NP-hard, then computing a committee that satisfies Pareto optimality and any other property is NP-hard as well. Similarly, if testing Pareto optimality of a committee is polynomial-time solvable and if it is known that testing property X of a committee is polynomial-time solvable, then it implies that testing whether a committee simultaneously satisfies Pareto optimality and X is polynomial-time solvable as well. If some axiom X is not compatible with Pareto optimality, it will be interesting to design algorithms that are Pareto optimal constrained to the set of committees that satisfy X.
Many of our algorithms to efficiently compute a Pareto optimal outcome are based on serial dictatorship based algorithms. It will be interesting to design alternative algorithms that also satisfy better fairness properties. Finally, we remark that our serial dictatorship algorithm can be used to define a multiwinner generalization of random serial dictatorship, which is worth investigating and which raises interesting computational problems.
